Most active networking research so far has focused on infrastructure issues, such as redefining system structures and interfaces, with a limited application context to drive development. This has led to a rich selection of node operating systems and execution environments, but mostly simple applications that have not exploited the underlying functionality to its full potential.
and NetFlow [9] impose an a-priori specification of the granularity of the traffic data in the form of standardized objects. Often however, users need accurate inter-flow data with exact packet arrival times (e.g. to measure burstiness or other transient phenomena). Presently, service providers have to rely on passive monitoring to overcome this problem, obtaining access to the full stream of packets flowing through their links [13] , indicating the demand for highly customizable monitoring and management functions.
• Denial of service attack detection and prevention This function requires timely updates for detection and prevention, when new attacks are discovered. With the attack itself exposing the limitations of the current system, it is difficult to predict and provide standard controls that are generic enough to handle the incident. Maximum extensibility, as is offered by the algorithmic programmability of active networks appears as a requirement.
• Accounting As in traffic analysis, the current standard practice of using a combination of SNMP and Netflow for accounting often becomes a bottleneck. For example, Netflow provides per-flow statistics when a service provider needs only a per-AS 1 matrix, resulting in excessive redundant traffic between the management station and managed element. On the other hand, the specific fields standardized in SNMP MIBs often do not contain the data that is needed by users, for example to distinguish ECN-marked from non-ECN marked traffic [28] or to obtain a per-DSCP matrix in Diffserv-enabled [4] networks.
These applications indicate a clear demand for a dynamically extensible management system that is justified by operational experience. Moreover, these applications could benefit from sharing the underlying (programmable) monitoring infrastructure. They may also require near real-time processing of the management information, as close to the information source as possible, which fits well with the model of programmability.
We also believe that these applications have reasonable implementation complexity for two reasons.
Primarily, they are part of the management plane and therefore do not interfere with the forwarding function.
Secondly, they can be implemented as a separate system, rather than having to modify a router. This allows us to build them on a lightweight active substrate using off-the-shelf operating system components, with reasonable additional effort.
In this paper we describe a proof-of-concept implementation of these management applications and the lightweight active substrate designed to support them. Our initial experiments demonstrate that such an incremental approach to active networking is indeed feasible, and the flexibility of the resulting system compared to its simplicity is admirable. We believe that this direction is worth investigating further. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the structure of the lightweight active substrate used for building the management applications. The applications are described in Section 3. An experimental study of the resulting system, demonstrating its simplicity and flexibility is provided in Section 4. In Section 5 we present related work. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and discuss issues that need to be addressed by future work.
Design of the Lightweight Active Management Environment
The active substrate of our architectures is built entirely on off-the-shelf components. We decided this was the correct approach for two reasons: firstly, the goal of the paper is not to build a new active networking infrastructure and secondly, our claim is that an active network can and should be built in an incremental fashion. The overall architecture of our system is shown in Figure 1 . The system is built around the OpenBSD 2.8 [1] operating system. OpenBSD provides an attractive platform for developing secure applications because of the well-integrated security features and libraries (e.g. IPsec stack, SSL, KeyNote, etc.). However, similar implementations are possible under other operating systems or active networking platforms.
Loader The module loader is implemented as a system daemon which accepts TCP connections at a specific port for loading and controlling modules. The users must authenticate to the active node by establishing a secure IPsec [17, 18] tunnel. The modules are implemented as native code shared objects. Upon receipt of a module the loader can either execute it in its own virtual address space, or load it inside the operating system kernel running on the node. The decision depends on the kind of credentials the objects uses to authenticate to the loader.
Core functionality Applications that use our system require access to the packets going through the node. On UNIX this can be accomplished using the Packet Capture library (pcap(3)) which provides wrapper functions for the Berkeley Packet Filter (bpf(4)). We extended the bpf tap function inside the bpf(4) device driver to process the packet and packet headers according to the privileges of the application.
For example some user application might be permitted access to only specific flows, as shown in Figure 2 , or provide anonymization of the packet header (e.g. Figure 3 ). The traffic information can be consequently used by the applications described in the Section 3.
Security We take a Trust Management [6] approach to mobile code security. Trust Management is a novel approach to solving the generalized authorization and security policy problem. Entities in a trustmanagement system (called "principals") are identified by public keys, and may generate signed policy statements (which are similar in form to public-key certificates) that further delegate and refine the authorization they hold. This results in an inherently decentralized policy system: the system enforcing the policy need only consider the relevant policies and delegation credentials, which the user needs to provide.
We have chosen to use KeyNote [5] as our trust management system. KeyNote provides a simple notation for specifying both local policies and credentials. Applications communicate with a "KeyNote evaluator" that interprets KeyNote assertions and returns results to applications. A KeyNote evaluator accepts as input a set of local policy and credential assertions, and a set of attributes, called an "action environment," that describes a proposed trusted action associated with a set of public keys (the requesting principals).
The KeyNote evaluator determines whether proposed actions are consistent with local policy by applying the assertion predicates to the action environment. In our system, we use the action environment as the place-holder of component-specific information (such as language constructs, resource bounds, etc.) and environment variables such as time of day, node name, that are important to the policy management function.
We use KeyNote for performing policy compliance checks and settings when loading up the incoming object code. The KeyNote credential specifies what resources will be allocated to the newly created process, as we will discuss in the next paragraph.
Resource control Object modules that execute inside the kernel have no resource bounds. However user level processes are assigned specific resource permissions depending on the credentials they carry. We rely on the rlimit structure of the UNIX operating system, where limits for CPU time, memory size, number of allowed processes, etc., are specified. We also forbid user processes from modifying those values. We did not attempt to make the environment totally tamperproof because that would have been beyond the application-oriented scope of this work. However, there has been extensive research in this field which can be easily incorporated in our system [19, 16] .
Applications

Traffic Regulation
The current Internet architecture offers very few protection mechanisms against ill-behaved traffic. Especially in recent years there has been an increase in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [25, 26] as well as as "flash crowd" effects. A denial of service attack occurs when a single or multiple hosts transmit large amount of traffic targeting a specific network node. Flash crowds occur when a large number of users access the same server simultaneously 2 , overwhelming the available resources.
The two main problems that need to be addressed with respect to traffic regulation are IP source address spoofing and traffic limiting. Both those problems are a natural fit for the area of active networks where we have the advantage of programmable nodes. As a matter of fact the proposed solutions [10, 32, 3, 31] essentially rely on some router programmability and can be easily adapted for active networks. The router programmability is necessary for the proposed schemes in order to mark packets as they flow through the network, and therefore be able to reconstruct the path later on. The reverse approach is taken by [21, 15] .
In their scheme they start from the site under attack and move upstream following the congested link all the way to the various flood sources.
The key benefit of using active networks to implement IP packet traceback and traffic rate limiting is the ability to adapt depending on the type of ill behaved traffic. For example, active networks give users the flexibility of dynamically deploying the appropriate protocol to counter a possible attack. Furthermore as new attacks are being invented it is easy to develop and deploy algorithms to counter them.
Traffic analysis
Monitoring traffic has been an important source of data for analyzing how the Internet operates. In many circumstances, the granularity of the information as offered by SNMP etc. is insufficient for the purposes of Internet research. Furthermore, most of the time researchers and developers cannot predict what kind of traces they might need in the future. This was also the main trigger for the development of passive measurement systems such as OC3MON [2] . These systems passively "listen" on a network link and dump packet headers on disk. These files can then be downloaded for off-line analysis. The flexibility lies in that these systems get the full stream of data that could be useful for later processing. There are, however, problems with the current schemes:
• Analysis of the data has to be performed post-mortem. There is no way to perform the measurements in real-time, unless there is "login" access to the measurement system. This restricts the use of the system to the actual infrastructure owner and their trusted parties.
• As the mismatch in growth trends between bandwidth, processing, disk speed and disk capacity increases, it is going to be increasingly impractical to maintain huge datasets for post-processing. Onthe-fly reduction of data, by processing, is becoming necessary.
The contribution of an active networking approach is that users, depending on established trust relationships, can install modules on the passive measurement system and manipulate its functionality on-the-fly.
We have built a simple analysis tool to demonstrate the power of an active networking solution. The goal of our module is to observe the existence of packet trains. A packet train can be loosely defined as a set of consecutive packets belonging to the same flow, as observed on a network link. This is typical, for instance, to TCP traffic, which, in its slow-start phase, injects two packets for each acknowledgement received. This kind of information, is not available through the standard network management mechanisms. Also, in a typical passive measurement system, it requires communication of all traffic to the analysis host. Our implementation
are also possible and easy to build on our system, which similar functionality is not supported or easy to extract from existing systems.
Accounting
The task of processing network usage statistics per accountable entity is important for managing an operational network. Often, this forms the basis for billing users for network usage. Simple billing schemes in use today rely on NetFlow or SNMP-type accounting for calculating the billing scheme parameters, usually in terms of traffic volume per network prefix. More recently, a different kind of pricing algorithms have been studied, especially with regard to providing differentiated services or controlling congestion. A representative example in this category is described in [20] which is based on the ECN mechanism [12, 28] . When the network becomes congested, routers mark packets probabilistically, with the probability depending on the level of congestion. Based on this approach, packets which are marked are charged a fixed amount of currency, and users who consume more resources during times of congestion are charged more than others .
This scheme provides a fair incentive for users to make reasonable use of the network during congestion.
To support ECN-based charging schemes, one must collect accounting information per network prefix as well as marked vs. non-marked packets. This is not supported by any of the existing router accounting
mechanisms. We will demonstrate that the implementation of this scheme based on our lightweight active substrate is fairly simple.
System Demonstration
We performed a number of experiments with our system implementation on the University of Pennsylvania Distributed Systems Lab test-bed shown in Figure 4 . We describe the setup and experiments that we performed to evaluate our architecture. A more extensive evaluation of our system will be included in the final version of the paper.
Our test-bed consists of 7 x86-based routers and an "edge" machine, all running OpenBSD 2. 
Traffic Regulation
To investigate the effects of traffic regulation we designed the following experiment. Kythira (source) starts a TCP connection with out edge host, Naxos (sink). We limit the flow to 10 Mbit/s using ALTQ on the source.
At times 5sec, 10sec and 15sec, Kerkyra, Ithaki and Paxoi, start an ICMP ECHO REQUEST flood attack to Naxos. As we detect the ICMP packet flooding we trace them back to their source and subsequently block the ICMP traffic. Figure 5 presents our results.
Traffic analysis
We have experimented with the packet train analysis module on the DSL testbed. Since our testbed does not carry real network traffic, for this specific experiment of traffic analysis, we generated traffic from host
Lefkada to host Cephalonia, based on a 7.5 hours long ATM header trace captured with a DAG3 system at the University of Auckland by the WAND research group in January 2001 3 . The module code, running on Cephalonia is shown in Figure 6 and the results of the measurements in Table 1 and Figure 7 . Note that even a non-privileged user may be allowed to install and run such a measurement module: no access to the packet payload is needed, and the algorithm works with anonymized packets as well. We believe that using our system, a network provider can permit the research community interested in traffic analysis to use 
Accounting
The implementation of the ECN accounting module is remarkably simple, as shown in Algorithm 8. For each packet, the module checks whether the CE (Congestion Experienced) bit is set on the IP header, and calls the accounting function add_to with the appropriate table of marked or unmarked traffic as an argument.
To test this module in our experimental set-up, we enabled ALTQ's ECN on the 100 Mbit/s link between Ithaki and Zacynthos (see figure 4) . We generate traffic from hosts behind Ithaki in the following way:
• A simulated Network A, where a mixture of TCP connections is generated based on ttcp, with a Poisson distribution for connection arrivals and an exponential distribution in connection duration (in bytes).
• A simulated Network B, with a mixture of TCP connections with short-lived bandwidth-savvy UDP streams , all using ttcp. UDP traffic is non-congestion controlled, and this is clearly reflected in the resulting charges in Table 2 void foolet_pkt(u_char *myparams, void *pcaphdr, u_char *pkt) { struct ip * iphdr = (struct ip *) (pkt + 14);
if ( iphdr->ip_tos & IPTOS_CE) add_to( marked_tbl , iphdr); else add_to( unmarked_tbl , iphdr); } Figure 8 : ECN accounting module code.
Related Work
A wide range of system tools have been developed for monitoring traffic and performing management functions. We review some of the most relevant efforts on the established set of tools used in operational environments, some tools that aim at adding extensibility elements (without reference to the active networking paradigm), and recent efforts related to active networking and monitoring.
The first instance of a measurement tool was based on Berkeley Packet Filter [23] . bpf(4) provides operating system functionality for traffic monitoring. Users are allowed to use filters, specified in a Filter Language. In practice, a lightweight virtual machine is used for flexibility. Of course, the capabilities of the system are limited: only forward branches are allowed and there is no communication with the environment; this is the task of the application that uses bpf(4). oc3mon [2] is a dedicated host-based monitor for 155Mbit/s OC3 ATM links. Only the first ATM cell out of each IP packet is transmitted from the ATM interface to the host system. The host records the captured headers into files for post-processing. No realtime functionality for packet processing is considered in the original design. For higher speed networks, the DAG series of monitoring-specific network cards have been developed, implementing some standard header processing functions in hardware [35] . Netramet [7] implements an SNMP-based Traffic Flow Measurement Architecture and Meter Management Information Base. The motivation for developing Netramet was to build a volume based charging system for scarce wide-area connectivity. Netramet inherits the limitations of SNMP and standards-based protocol designs with regard to flexibility. ntop(8) [11] is an end-system network monitoring tool that shares a subset of the motives of our approach to extensibility. ntop(8) allows plugins, in forms of shared libraries, to be developed independently from the system core. The difference lies in that full trust in plugins is assumed and no further security-enhancing function is build into the system. Also, there is no notion of using the measurement data for router control and no provisions for distributed applications across the node boundaries. ntop(8) also offers an integrated Web-server where users can access the monitoring data using a Web browser as the user interface. Chariot [24] is a commercial product for active measurements in the sense of sending probe traffic through the network and measuring its performance end-to-end , rather than snooping on the actual user traffic on the wire.
Chariot enables modules to be loaded to the measurement systems for generating traffic that corresponds to typical application workload (media streaming, web traffic, e-mail) to a high-level of emulation accuracy (rather than shrink-wrapped traffic models). Windmill [22] is an extensible network probe environment which allows loading of "experiments" on the probe, with the purpose of analyzing protocol performance.
The NIMI project [27] provides a platform for large-scale Internet measurement, with Java and Python based modules. NIMI only allows active measurements (i.e. handling of probe packets, in contrast to getting real traffic from the wire). The security policy and resource control issues are addressed using standard ACL-like schemes. The trust management approach is better suited than simple ACLs, providing a simpler and more fine-grained policy verification mechanism. Also, while dealing with passive measurement is a greater challenge from an implementation perspective, it offers more insight into network operation (in fact, an exact image of what is happening on the wire) than active measurements.
In the active networking arena, ABLE [30, 29] provides an environment for network management applications. It allows applications to monitor the network by polling devices using SNMP, with the goal is to execute the SNMP applications closer to the managed elements to reduce the communication burden. No snooping of packets takes place in this approach, hence the information that ABLE has access to is inherently limited to what is exposed through the SNMP MIBs.
Conclusions and Future Work
In search for active networking applications, we have shown that network management offers excellent soil for applying design principles of open and extensible systems. This is mostly due to the continuously evolving and highly diverse nature of the monitoring applications. These characteristics impede designers and users from predicting and agreeing on a set of functions that can satisfy the needs of monitoring application in the long-term.
We have built an active substrate, based on off-the-shelf system components, and developed a set of simple applications to validate our claims. We believe that an application-centric, incremental effort, as demonstrated in this paper, could lead to experimental deployment of active networking technology in real networks and also advance our understanding of the most crucial issues in the field. Our implementation can control host-based OpenBSD routers for demonstration purposes. Extending our system to perform Active Router Control functions involving production routers is needed to stimulate wider deployment of our system and applications.
Towards this end, developing practical network applications has given us insight on several issues that need to be addressed. This future work needs to target both improving the applications themselves, further enhancing and aligning them to the mechanisms and concepts of active networking, as well as improving the services and structure of the active substrate. In particular, we see tremendous potential in the use of network processors [14] . In particular, our system can be improved by moving the filtering function as well as some of the processing of the modules to the network processor micro-engines. This increases scalability for two basic reasons. Firstly, by reducing communication between the main processor and the network interface, which appears as a bottleneck in PCI-based systems. Secondly, by offloading the packet processing task from the main system or distributing the processing burden between main processor and network processor.
Monitoring may, in turn, reveal different requirements on the network processor design: monitoring is quite processing-intensive, while current network processor designs may be tailored to performing forwarding-type functions.
Lastly, we are interested in seeing more applications developed on this platform, to further refine its structure and interfaces.
